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The hardest engineering problem in small-scale behind-the-meter compute is also the least discussed. It has an elegant solution.

Two machines with incompatible preferences

Put a gas reciprocating engine and an AI inference cluster on the same electrical bus and you have created a conflict.

The engine wants to run at or near its rated output, continuously. That is where its heat rate is best, where fuel consumption per kilowatt-hour is lowest, where its maintenance intervals are designed to sit, and where its capital cost is amortized most efficiently. Run it at forty percent load and the fuel efficiency degrades, the maintenance schedule tightens, and the cost per kilowatt-hour you are actually producing climbs sharply.

The inference cluster wants something else entirely. Its load follows customer demand, which is diurnal, bursty, and outside your control. It has quiet periods overnight and during model updates. It has spikes when a customer’s application sees traffic. Its average utilization is materially below its peak, and the gap between the two is not small.

This is the ballast problem, and at hyperscale it barely exists. A large grid-connected facility simply draws what it needs and the system operator handles the balancing across thousands of other loads and generators. The variability disappears into a much larger pool.

Behind the meter at sub-10 MW scale, there is no pool. You are the balancing authority for your own island, and the mismatch between what your generation wants and what your load provides is entirely your problem.

Both obvious answers are bad

Size the generation to the compute peak, and your engines spend most of their life at partial load. You have paid for capacity you use intermittently, you are burning fuel inefficiently whenever you are below rated output, and your effective cost per delivered kilowatt-hour can be far above the number in your model. The economics that looked compelling on a spreadsheet assuming full utilization do not survive contact with a real load curve.

Size the generation to the compute average, and you have created a facility that cannot serve its customer during peaks. For a compute buyer, curtailment is close to a disqualifying property. They are running production inference against a service level commitment of their own; being told to reduce load at their busiest hour is not a trade they will accept at any discount.

Add batteries and you improve things at the margin, but storage sized to fill multi-hour troughs at these power levels is expensive enough to erase the cost advantage you built the site to capture.

The shape of the actual solution

What the problem calls for is a second load with a very specific set of properties.

It has to be genuinely interruptible — not ‘interruptible with notice’ but capable of shedding in seconds, without human intervention, without damage, and without a customer to apologize to. It has to be able to absorb any quantity of power up to the full output of the plant. It has to have no service level obligation of its own. And it has to generate enough revenue per kilowatt-hour to be worth running rather than simply being a resistive dump load.

Bitcoin mining satisfies every one of these conditions, and it is close to the only thing that does.

A mining load can be curtailed to zero and restored in seconds under automated control. It has no customer, no SLA, and no state to lose — an interrupted hash attempt is simply abandoned with no consequence. It scales granularly, machine by machine. And it converts marginal electricity into a liquid commodity at a price that, while volatile, is knowable and hedgeable.

With that second load in place, the operating logic inverts. You size generation to serve the compute peak with proper redundancy. The compute load takes priority absolutely, at every instant. Every kilowatt-hour the compute load is not consuming goes to hashing. When compute demand rises, hashing sheds instantly to make room.

The generation runs at or near rated output continuously, which is where its economics are best. The compute customer never sees curtailment. And the marginal cost of serving that customer falls, because the fixed costs of the generation plant are spread across a machine that is fully utilized rather than one that idles.

What this is not

This is not a bitcoin mining business with a data center attached, and the distinction matters.

In the configuration we are describing, the compute load is the priority load and the economic anchor. The mining load is infrastructure — a mechanism for converting otherwise-wasted generation capacity into revenue, and for keeping the prime movers in their efficient operating band. If mining revenue disappeared entirely, the site would still function; it would simply be less efficient.

That ordering has to be enforced in the control system rather than in a business plan, and it is worth asking any operator making this claim how the dispatch priority is actually implemented. A site where the mining load can outbid the compute load under some price condition is a mining site with marketing attached.

It is also worth being honest about the exposures this introduces. Hashprice is volatile and has been unkind to unhedged operators. Mining hardware depreciates aggressively. Some jurisdictions have taken explicit policy positions against mining load — British Columbia has permanently barred new grid connections for it, which is one of several reasons why behind-the-meter siting matters here rather than being merely convenient.

Why this only matters at small scale

There is a reason this problem is not widely discussed: at hyperscale it does not arise, because the grid absorbs the variability.

Which is precisely why the solution is interesting. The load-following architecture is not a compromise forced on small operators by their lack of scale. It is a capability available specifically to operators who own their generation, control their dispatch, and are small enough to be nimble about it.

A 500 MW grid-connected campus cannot do this. A 5 MW behind-the-meter site can, and it converts what looks like a structural disadvantage — no grid to lean on — into a genuine cost advantage.

The ballast problem is real. Most of the small-scale behind-the-meter models that have failed did so because they did not solve it, or assumed full utilization and discovered otherwise. Solving it properly is most of the difference between a compelling model and a working site.

Two provinces have now written grid scarcity into regulation. The read-through for developers is not what most of the market assumes. Alberta's system operator is processing roughly 20.7 gigawatts of data centre connection requests. The interim framework it introduced allows up to 1,200 megawatts of large load to connect between now and 2028, and that allocation has already been assigned. For scale: the entire City of Edmonton draws around 1,400 MW. The requests exceed the available capacity by a factor of roughly seventeen. Two provinces have now written grid scarcity into regulation. The read-through for developers is not what most of the market assumes. The number that reframes everything Alberta's system operator is processing roughly 20.7 gigawatts of data centre connection requests. The interim framework it introduced allows up to 1,200 megawatts of large load to connect between now and 2028, and that allocation has already been assigned. For scale: the entire City of Edmonton draws around 1,400 MW. So the requests exceed the available capacity by a factor of roughly seventeen. This is not a queue in any meaningful sense. A queue implies that if you wait long enough, you reach the front. What Alberta has is a closed allocation with a very long line outside it, and no published commitment on what capacity might open up beyond 2028. None of this reflects an unwillingness to serve the industry. Alberta's government has been among the most enthusiastic in the country about attracting data centre investment. The constraint is physical: large loads of this character behave in ways the grid was not designed to accommodate, and the generation and transmission required to serve them at this scale has not been built yet. The system operator is being responsible, not obstructive. British Columbia took a different route to the same place On 1 February 2026, BC's Data Centre and Hydrogen Production Facility Power Supply Regulation came into force. Rather than manage scarcity through interconnection process, BC legislated it directly. The regulation caps new electrical capacity that BC Hydro may make available for data centre purposes: 100 MW per two-year period for conventional data centres, 300 MW per two-year period for AI data centres. These are system-wide aggregate limits, not per-project ones. The definition of an AI data centre is deliberately wide. Any facility where ten percent or more of supplied electricity goes to AI computation, the storage and processing of data related to that computation, or the equipment and infrastructure supporting it, falls inside the category. A great many operators who do not think of themselves as AI facilities will find that they qualify. Most consequentially, BC replaced first-come-first-served connection with a competitive process administered by BC Hydro. Capacity is now awarded on provincial criteria: employment, revenue contribution, alignment with economic objectives. The province was explicit in its reasoning — data centres generally provide fewer jobs and less revenue per megawatt than natural resource projects, and BC intends its clean electricity to go where it delivers most. That is a defensible policy position. It is also a decisive change in what it means to develop compute infrastructure in British Columbia. What Saskatchewan tells us The most instructive data point in the region is not a constraint at all. It is what happened when a very large, very well-capitalised counterparty went to build in Saskatchewan. Bell's announced AI data centre outside Regina is being served by SaskPower with 300 MW of interconnection capacity built in two phases through 2027. But the project also includes SaskEnergy developing natural gas infrastructure — a new high-pressure pipeline and a high-volume meter station — for on-site gas-fired generation to serve peak operational demand and backup. Read that again. A national telecommunications incumbent, with a supportive provincial government and a Crown utility actively building transmission for it, is still putting gas generation on site. If the largest and best-connected participants in this market are self-supplying part of their load, the question for everyone else is not whether behind-the-meter generation is legitimate. It is why anyone would expect to succeed without it. The read-through most developers are getting wrong The dominant industry response to grid scarcity has been to get better at competing for scarce grid capacity. Larger land positions. More sophisticated queue strategy. Longer option periods. Relationships with system operators and provincial governments. All of this is rational and some of it will work. Somebody wins the BC competitive allocation. Somebody holds the Alberta capacity that has been assigned. But it is worth being clear about what that strategy is: it is a bet that you will be selected, on criteria set by a third party, on a timeline you do not control. For a developer with the balance sheet to hold land for a decade, that is a perfectly good bet. For anyone trying to deliver capacity to a customer within the next thirty-six months, it is not a plan. The alternative is unglamorous. Build smaller. Generate your own power. Site at the fuel rather than at the load. Accept operating burdens that grid-connected developers get to outsource, in exchange for a delivery timeline that belongs to you. The trade, stated honestly Behind-the-meter development is not free. You become a generation operator, with everything that implies: fuel supply management, emissions compliance, maintenance cycles, spares inventory, and the permanent obligation to keep machines running that a utility customer never thinks about. You carry fuel price exposure directly. You have no grid to lean on when a unit trips, so redundancy must be engineered rather than assumed. Your permitting path is different, not necessarily easier. Anyone presenting this as a shortcut is not describing the same business we are in. What it buys is control. Your power pathway does not depend on a regulator's discretion, a competitive process you have not won, or transmission that has not been built. That is currently the scarcest asset in the industry, and it is not available for purchase at any price. Where this leads If the constraint is real and durable — and two provinces writing it into regulation suggests it is — then the shape of what gets built changes. Not one large facility waiting on an interconnection, but many small ones sited where fuel is available and delivered on a manufacturing cadence rather than a construction one. That is a different asset class with different economics, a different customer, and different risks. Over the coming weeks we will work through each of those in turn: the energy economics that only close at small scale, the segment of the market that nobody currently serves, and why inference workloads are suited to distributed infrastructure in ways training never will be. The arithmetic is the starting point. Twenty-point-seven against one-point-two. Everything else follows from taking that seriously. Forward-looking statements. This content contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of applicable securities laws, including statements regarding business strategy, planned infrastructure development and market opportunity. Forward-looking statements involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties, and actual results may differ materially. Readers should not place undue reliance on them. See the Company's filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission for a discussion of risk factors. The Company undertakes no obligation to update forward-looking statements except as required by law.

FingerMotion, Inc. (NASDAQ: FNGR) ("FingerMotion" or the "Company"), a mobile services, data and technology company, today announced a strategic evolution of its corporate direction designed to position the Company for long-term growth through diversification, international expansion, and emerging technology initiatives.


Management has outlined a long-term strategic direction to evolve toward a more diversified corporate growth platform, with implementation activities intended to be progressively phased in over future fiscal periods.


As market conditions and capital allocation priorities evolve, the Company continues to view its telecommunications, platform, and technology businesses as foundational and expects to strengthen these areas through initiatives aimed at improving efficiency, streamlining operations, and enhancing operating performance.


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